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Government Speech and the Publicly Employed 
Attorney 
Margaret Tarkington 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In its recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded its 
theory of government speech in such a way that constitutional free 
speech rights are nullified merely by categorizing the speech as 
“government speech.”1 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme 
Court nullified the free speech rights of public employees vis-à-vis 
their employers by applying the government speech doctrine to the 
speech of public employees whenever they speak pursuant to their 
official duties. The Court held that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties . . . the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”2  
The incorporation of the government speech idea into the realm 
of public employee speech was a new development. Before Garcetti, 
the test created in Pickering v. Board of Education3 was used to 
                                                                                                           
  Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School; Visiting Associate 
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 1. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) 
(explaining that if the speech at issue is “a form of government speech,” it “is therefore not 
subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause” (emphasis added)); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. 
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (noting that government speech is completely “exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny” (emphasis added)). 
Notably, prior cases indicated that the Free Speech Clause prohibited viewpoint-based 
restrictions even where government speech was at issue. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts 
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing constitutional question would arise if 
Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to 
drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 193 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) 
(“The case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in 
such a way as to ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’ . . . We find no indication that 
the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had that effect.” 
(quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). 
 2.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 3.  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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determine if a public employee could be punished by an employer 
for her speech. The Pickering test balanced the free speech interests 
of the speaker and recipients with the government employer’s 
interest in an efficient and effective work environment.4 The Garcetti 
rule is in stark contrast: There is no balancing of the interests—
courts examine neither the importance of the speech nor the lack of 
disruption to the workplace. Rather, if the speech is made pursuant 
to the public employee’s official duties, the Free Speech Clause is 
inapplicable and provides no protection to the employee. 
The rule in Garcetti and the government speech doctrine in 
general have been examined and criticized as problematic from a 
number of viewpoints.5 One aspect that has not received sufficient 
                                                                                                           
 4.  See id. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463 (2007) (arguing that Garcetti was 
incorrectly decided, but also arguing that Due Process may provide a solution); Ruben J. 
Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for 
Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 22 (2008) (arguing that statutes are 
insufficient to protect whistleblowers and arguing, despite Garcetti, for a move to greater 
constitutional protection for such speech); Risa L. Lieberwitz, Linking Professional Academic 
Freedom, Free Speech, and Racial and Gender Equality, 53 LOY. L. REV. 165, 165 (2007) 
(“address[ing] the potential impact of Garcetti on constitutional rights of public sector 
faculty”); Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 210 (2008) 
(arguing that Garcetti “was not in the public’s best interest and refut[ing] arguments that 
federal and state whistleblower laws and civil rights laws provide adequate protections for 
public educators who expose questionable school practices”); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public 
Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti is “unsound as a matter of First 
Amendment policy” for multiple reasons, including “because it under-protects public 
employee speech that is vital to self-government,” and because “it creates perverse incentives 
for public employees to go public and for their employers to broaden job descriptions to 
capture as much employee speech as possible”); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee 
Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1, 4, 34 (2009) (noting that “[l]ower courts routinely apply [Garcetti] to dispose of the First 
Amendment claims of a wide range of public employees punished for their on-the-job reports 
of safety hazards, ethical improprieties, and other government misconduct,” and arguing that 
the Garcetti rule should apply only to “the speech of public employees that [the government] 
has specifically hired to deliver a particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in 
origin and thus open to meaningful credibility and accountability checks by the public”); 
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal 
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1202 (2006) (“Garcetti adopted a 
prophylactic rule in a situation in which the individualized circumstances supporting rule-based 
adjudication were missing.”); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment 
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 118 (2008) (“In the 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011  4:28 PM 
2175 Government Speech and the Publicly Employed Attorney 
 2177 
discussion, however, arises from the facts of Garcetti itself—namely, 
the special problem of using the government speech doctrine where 
the public employee is also an attorney.6  
The facts of Garcetti itself demonstrate the problem with 
applying the government speech doctrine to attorney speech. 
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles 
County.7 Ceballos was contacted by the defense about a potential 
problem with a search warrant that was critical in a certain 
prosecution. Ceballos made his own inquiry into the matter, 
including talking with the affiant of the warrant, and concluded that 
the warrant contained serious misrepresentations.8 He wrote a memo 
to his superiors and recommended dismissal of the case, but his 
superiors refused to dismiss it.9 He then gave the memorandum to 
the defense (after redacting his conclusions as work product) and 
testified at the suppression hearing.10 As a consequence of these 
actions, Ceballos suffered adverse employment actions, including 
reassignment, transfer, and denial of a promotion.11 As explained in 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, Ceballos believed that the speech contained 
in the memo “fell within the scope of his obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland” and progeny “to learn of, to preserve, and to 
                                                                                                           
name of managerial prerogative, federalism, and separation of powers, Garcetti has the effect of 
making government less transparent, accountable, and responsive.”); Susan P. Stuart, Citizen 
Teacher: Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2008) 
(calling Garcetti “perhaps one of the most extraordinarily ill-considered—and short-sighted—
opinions penned by the United States Supreme Court in recent years” and discussing the 
“adverse impact” that Garcetti is having on teachers and school administrators). But see 
Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti properly “recognized a prerogative of 
public employers to regulate duty-related speech of public employees in order to ensure that 
these officials are accountable for the manner in which the offices that they hold discharge their 
public duties”). 
 6.  In its Summer 2007 issue, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Magazine included two 
pieces briefly discussing Garcetti as applied to defense attorneys and prosecutors. See J. Vincent 
Aprille II, Public Defenders, Official Duties, and the First Amendment, ABA CRIM. JUST. MAG., 
Summer 2007, at 5 (arguing that Garcetti should not be applied to public defenders because 
of their unique role in the government employment structure and because they must be 
independent of state control); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Professional Independence, ABA 
CRIM. JUST. MAG., Summer 2007, at 4 (arguing that Garcetti highlights the inadequacy of 
rules and standards of prosecutorial conduct and the need for prosecutors’ offices to encourage 
conduct like that of Ceballos). 
 7. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413. 
 8.  See id. at 413–14. 
 9. See id. at 414. 
 10. See id. at 442 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 11. See id. at 415 (majority opinion). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011  4:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2178 
communicate with the defense about exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence.”12 
Despite the fact that Ceballos’s speech may have been required 
by the Constitution and rules of professional conduct to protect the 
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant (the Court did not 
actually examine whether or not it was so required),13 and despite his 
disclosure of potential government misconduct, the Supreme Court 
held that his speech enjoyed no First Amendment protection 
whatsoever.14 His employer could freely discipline him for his 
speech.15 In so holding, the Court incorporated the rule from its 
government speech cases—namely, that speech made by public 
employees in the scope of their official duties is treated as the 
government’s own speech and the First Amendment is inapplicable. 
                                                                                                           
 12. Id. at 446–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 13. The dissent noted that Ceballos had argued that the memo “fell within the scope of 
his obligations under Brady v. Maryland” and its progeny “to learn of, to preserve, and to 
communicate with the defense about exculpatory and impeachment evidence.” Id. However, 
the majority never even discussed the possible characterization of the memo as Brady material. 
Such an omission is problematic because it creates an interpretation of the Garcetti majority 
that, regardless of whether the memo was Brady material, there is no First Amendment 
protection for it. 
Lawrence Rosenthal argues that Ceballos’s speech did not qualify technically as 
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. Rosenthal argues that “Ceballos learned of the 
circumstantial evidence suggesting police perjury from the defense counsel and his inspection 
of the area described in the warrant application, not as the result of any information in the 
exclusive possession of the District Attorney or Sheriff’s office. Ceballos’s opinion about the 
affiant’s veracity similarly was not exculpatory information; he had no special ability to evaluate 
the evidence.” See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 56–57 (emphasis added).  
Rosenthal may ultimately be “right” that a court could determine that the memo was 
not Brady material; yet, as noted, the Supreme Court’s decision does not appear to turn on 
such a distinction. Indeed, the Court did not decide whether or not Ceballos’s memo was 
within or outside the confines of Brady. The possible Brady characterization of the material is 
raised by the Garcetti dissent, see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but 
never even mentioned by the majority. The Garcetti Court’s conclusion that Ceballos’s speech 
was denied constitutional protection appears to be based entirely on the fact that the speech 
was made within the scope of his official prosecutorial duties, and not because it fell outside 
the requirements of Brady. Moreover, the Garcetti case was decided on a motion for summary 
judgment, which means that all evidence and inferences had to be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the losing party—namely, Ceballos. Id. at 442 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Finally, in addition to viewing the premises and the circumstantial evidence raised by the 
defense, Ceballos, as a member of the prosecution, talked twice with the police affiant for the 
warrant about the contents of the affidavit to determine if there was any satisfactory 
explanation for the discrepancies. See id. at 414 (majority opinion). Such information perhaps 
was “in the exclusive possession of the District Attorney or Sheriff’s office.” Rosenthal, supra 
note 5, at 57. 
 14. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. 
 15. See id. 
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As Helen Norton has summarized, in Garcetti, “the majority created 
a bright-line rule that treats public employees’ speech delivered 
pursuant to their official duties as the government’s own speech—
that is, speech that the government has bought with a salary and thus 
may control free from First Amendment scrutiny.”16 
While the Garcetti rule may be problematic for a number of 
reasons, it is particularly troubling as applied to publicly employed 
attorney speech. Attorney speech (including the speech of publicly 
employed attorneys) is not government speech and should not be 
treated as government speech. In examining this problem, it is 
important to note that a primary contingent of publicly employed 
attorneys is employed in the criminal justice system as either 
prosecutors or criminal defense attorneys. It is within this criminal 
setting that I will examine the Garcetti rule. 
As discussed in Part II, a major premise of the government 
speech doctrine—allowing the government to make expressive 
choices—does not apply to criminal process. Compliance with the 
Constitution (or not) upon prosecution of an individual is not an 
“expressive choice” left to government discretion. Moreover, as 
shown in Part III, the primary justification underlying the 
government speech doctrine—the idea of political accountability—
does not exist for discipline imposed on the publicly employed 
attorney. Importantly, political accountability is both insufficient and 
inadequate to protect the constitutional interests at stake. 
Indeed, the content of the “government message” is dictated by 
the Constitution and the role of attorneys in our system of justice, 
which will be explored in Part IV. Finally, as discussed in Part V, the 
scope of government control inherent in the theory and practice of 
the government speech doctrine is at odds and interferes with the 
core function of the publicly employed attorney. 
II. PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IS NOT AN EXPRESSIVE 
CHOICE 
It is hard to even wrap one’s head around the idea of attorney 
speech in the criminal process being “government speech”—
meaning a message that the government has decided as a matter of 
policy to promote. On a very simplistic level such speech might be 
categorized as government speech because (1) the government pays 
                                                                                                           
 16. Norton, supra note 5, at 12. 
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the salaries of the prosecution and often the defense as well, and 
consequently, (2) what is said by them is funded and thus owned by 
the government and can be (and, within certain boundaries, is) 
shaped by government policies. Unfortunately, this simplistic view 
does not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, a review of the government 
speech cases illustrates how tortuous it is to fit publicly-employed 
attorney speech into the government speech doctrine.  
Rust v. Sullivan is one of the defining opinions for the 
government speech doctrine. In Rust, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services implemented regulations that forbade recipients of 
Title X funding from any activities that “encourage, promote or 
advocate abortion as a method of family planning.”17 Indeed, the 
regulations prohibited doctors receiving Title X funding from 
counseling regarding abortion or referring a woman to an abortion 
provider.18 The Supreme Court upheld the regulations, explaining: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, 
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes 
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an 
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in 
another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated 
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity 
to the exclusion of the other.19 
Because the government has the option of not funding the program 
at all, it can choose how to shape it. As the Court elaborated, “when 
the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it 
is entitled to define the limits of that program.”20 Similarly, in 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the government chose to 
promote beef through an assessment on cattle sales, including 
creating the ads, “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.”21 As with Rust, the 
theory underlying the Johanns decision is that the government has 
the option to fund a program (or not), and thus can define the 
content thereof.22 In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,23 the Court 
                                                                                                           
 17. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 193. 
 20.  Id. at 194. 
 21. 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005). 
 22. See id. at 559 (“We have generally assumed . . . that compelled funding of 
government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”). 
 23. 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009). 
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examined governmental placement of privately donated monuments 
in public parks, and determined that such constituted government 
speech. The Court explained: “The Free Speech Clause restricts 
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate 
government speech. A government entity has the right to ‘speak for 
itself.’ ‘[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,’ and to select the views that 
it wants to express.”24 Thus the government speech cases generally 
involve areas where the government seems to have expressive choice 
in using public funds—indeed, it need not fund the item or program 
at all. The government can decide either to put monuments in parks 
or to not have monuments in parks. The government can fund 
women’s healthcare through Title X or not. It can promote beef—or 
chicken or bacon or veganism. And if taxpayers disagree with any of 
these expressive choices, they don’t have a First Amendment right to 
receive a different message; rather, as discussed more fully below, 
citizens can employ political accountability by voting those public 
officials out of office.25  
In stark contrast, the criminal justice system is not an “expressive 
choice” belonging to the government. Theoretically, state and 
federal governments could choose not to prosecute anyone, but once 
they choose to prosecute someone, they lose in large part the ability 
to choose what “message” to promote. The government is exerting 
power to deprive people of life, liberty, and/or property. The 
Constitution requires that such deprivations be handled with specific 
guarantees in place; indeed, the Constitution makes several express 
guarantees specific to criminal prosecutions.26 The Constitution does 
not give the government an “expressive choice” of whether or not to 
comply with constitutionally required criminal processes.  
Granted, prosecutors have some expressive choice, generally 
referred to as prosecutorial discretion, as to whether or not to 
prosecute certain crimes. What prosecutorial discretion does not 
include, however, is discretion to disregard the Constitution once a 
decision to prosecute is made. Using Garcetti as an example, the 
Constitution precludes the government from having the expressive 
choice of failing to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense.27 
                                                                                                           
 24. Id. at 1131 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of 
government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV, § 1. 
 27. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the 
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Government has even less “expressive choice” for the publicly 
employed defense attorney. The Constitution requires that the 
government provide adequate representation for defense, which 
includes providing to the criminal defendant an independent 
attorney.28 Government does not have the expressive choice to fail to 
provide counsel to criminal defendants where the Constitution 
requires it.29  
Moreover, in a number of the government speech cases, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized the option of an alternative forum 
for citizens to express a contrary message.30 Rust v. Sullivan is 
illustrative. The doctors in Rust were not prohibited from promoting 
and recommending abortions outside of their work at a Title X 
project31 and were not required to work in clinics funded by Title 
X.32 The Court emphasized that doctors could fund their own clinics 
that recommended abortion if they disagreed with the government’s 
message. By extension, as related to National Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley,33 private individuals can fund art that the national 
government fails to fund; and, as to Summum, individuals can fund 
and promote their own private monuments and parks. 
The criminal justice system is not even in this realm; there simply 
is no private speech or non-government alternative. The subordinate 
prosecutor who wants to comply with the Constitution against his 
supervisor’s wishes cannot prosecute an individual in a different 
forum, and the criminal defendant cannot choose to be prosecuted 
in another forum where constitutional processes are closely attended. 
To talk of an alternate forum separate from government funding 
where the citizens involved (here the attorneys and the defendant) 
                                                                                                           
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process . . . .”). 
 28. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–24 (1981). 
 29. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963). 
 30. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 n.5 (1991); FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (explaining that “a statutory mechanism” that 
would allow broadcasters to engage in the prohibited speech when using non-federal funds 
“would plainly be valid”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
545–48 (1983).  
 31. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (explaining that doctors working in a Title X project “can 
continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion 
advocacy,” but they must “conduct those activities through programs that are separate and 
independent from the project that receives Title X funds”). 
 32.  See id. at 199 n.5 (explaining that recipients are “in no way compelled to operate a 
Title X project; to avoid the force of the regulations, [they] can decline the subsidy” and can 
“financ[e] their own unsubsidized program”). 
 33. 524 U.S. 569 (1997). 
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can promote their desired message doesn’t even make sense. The 
only available forum for expression is the underlying prosecution, 
with constitutional process as the government’s only option. The 
government employs the judge, the prosecution, and often the 
defense counsel. There simply is not a non-government-funded 
forum where alternate speech can serve a meaningful role or can 
adequately affect the government’s assertion of power over the 
defendant.  
While the government can fund art or beef or monuments as it 
pleases, the criminal justice system is not a case of government 
“say[ing] what it wishes.”34 Rather, it is coercive government power 
being exerted against specific individuals, which brings into play 
constitutional limits. Such use of government power is not an 
“expressive choice”: It is the deprivation of life, liberty, and/or 
property and must include the appropriate protections thereof. 
III. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The major justification underlying the Supreme Court’s theory 
of government speech is the idea of political accountability. As the 
Court explained: “When the government speaks, for instance to 
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the 
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy.”35 Consequently, “[i]f the citizenry objects, newly elected 
officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”36 If 
people don’t like the government’s message or funding choices, they 
can fix this problem via democratic correctives—primarily by voting 
                                                                                                           
 34. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 437 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 35. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. 
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. 
Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that 
observers will associate permanent displays with the governmental property owner, that the 
government will be able to avoid political accountability for the views that it endorses or expresses 
through this means.” (emphasis added)); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563 (majority opinion) 
(explaining that “[s]ome of our cases have justified compelled funding of government speech 
by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic accountability,” and finding 
that sufficient accountability existed). 
 36. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (noting that “[i]f the citizenry objects [to the manner 
in which the government promotes its own policies], newly elected officials later could espouse 
some different or contrary position”). 
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their government speakers out of office. As summarized by Helen 
Norton: “Political accountability, rather than the Free Speech 
Clause, provides the recourse for those unhappy with their 
government’s expressive choices.”37 
As Norton persuasively argues, in order for political 
accountability to work, there must be transparency and the 
government must actually articulate its message.38 Indeed, as is 
apparent from cases such as Johanns and Summum, the Supreme 
Court has failed to ensure either transparency or articulation. The 
majority in Johanns insisted that there would be political 
accountability for the beef promotion ads because citizens who 
objected to governmental promotion of beef could employ 
democratic correctives and remove the beef promoters from office.39 
Yet, as countered by the dissent, in upholding the Beef Act, the 
majority “fail[ed] to require the government to show its hand.”40 
The dissent noted that when the ad says “funded by America’s beef 
producers” that “all but ensures that no one reading them will 
suspect that the message comes from the National Government.”41 
Political accountability is thus completely lacking. Since the public 
will think the speech comes from independent beef sellers, it lacks 
the knowledge to lay blame at the government’s door if it objects to 
the message or to the use of public funds. The public will not 
employ democratic correctives, not because the democratic 
correctives don’t exist or because the public approves the message, 
but because the public doesn’t realize that it is the government that 
is providing the speech at issue.  
Notably, in Summum, both majority and concurring opinions 
seem to agree that there is political accountability for a statue placed 
in a public park.42 If people don’t like it, they will know that the 
message comes from the government and will elect different 
representatives. However, the problem in Summum is that the Court 
does not require that the government articulate its message. Instead 
                                                                                                           
 37. Norton, supra note 5, at 22. 
 38. See id. at 27–32. 
 39. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563–64. 
 40. Id. at 572 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 577. 
 41. Id. at 577. 
 42. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009); see also id. at 1139 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that observers will associate 
permanent displays with the governmental property owner, that the government will be able to 
avoid political accountability for the views that it endorses or expresses through this means.”).  
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the Court says that a statue could mean one thing to one group and 
something different to someone else.43 The Summum Court 
illustrates this by discussing the “message” of a mosaic in Central 
Park featuring the word “Imagine” in memory of John Lennon.44 
Indeed, the Court presumes that the government is promoting a 
constitutionally permissible message without any real examination of 
the content of that message and without requiring the government 
to articulate its message.45 Perhaps it could be argued that 
articulation is a superfluous step because the government could likely 
come up with a permissible message. Yet, failing to require 
government to take that step means that government does not even 
have to examine or be cautious regarding its messages. 
Consequently, the Court allows government to avoid accountability 
by permitting it to conceal (and not even undertake self-examination 
regarding) the content of the message it promotes.  
The problems with political accountability justifying the lack of 
recourse to the Free Speech Clause exist in several government 
speech cases (as Johanns and Summum illustrate), yet they are 
particularly acute in the area of speech by publicly employed 
attorneys.  
First, while transparency may not be an issue in the criminal 
process context (perhaps there is no clearer instance of government 
providing a person with a message than by prosecution), articulation 
is certainly a problem. Notably, as in Summum, the Garcetti Court 
did not require the prosecutor’s office to articulate its message nor 
did the Court examine the government’s message closely. What is 
the message the prosecutor’s office was promoting by punishing 
Ceballos for writing a memo exposing potential police perjury and 
attempting to provide a criminal defendant with exculpatory 
evidence? They certainly were not promoting a message of careful 
compliance with constitutional processes and ethical obligations.46 
                                                                                                           
 43. Id. at 1135–36. 
 44. Id. at 1135 & n.2 (“What, for example, is ‘the message’ of the Greco-Roman 
mosaic of the word ‘Imagine’ that was donated to New York City’s Central Park in memory of 
John Lennon. Some observers may ‘imagine’ the musical contributions that John Lennon 
would have made if he had not been killed. Others may think of the lyrics of the Lennon song 
that obviously inspired the mosaic and may ‘imagine’ a world without religion, countries, 
possessions, greed, or hunger.”). 
 45. See id. at 1135–37. 
 46. Rosenthal argues that the Constitution does not guarantee to “an accused . . . an 
advocate inside of the prosecutor’s office who will protect the accused’s rights.” Rosenthal, 
supra note 5, at 45. However, Rosenthal contends that professional ethics rules place a broader 
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But as in Summum,47 the Garcetti Court just assumed that whatever 
message was being promoted was acceptable because, under the 
government speech doctrine, the government “is entitled to say what 
it wishes.”48 But, again, even assuming that government can say 
whatever it wishes, that does not undermine the importance of 
articulation. If government were required to articulate the message it 
was promoting (in order to protect itself from a Free Speech Clause 
challenge), then it should also be required to show how the speech 
or conduct at issue fits within that message. A prosecutor’s office has 
the constitutionally and ethically dictated message of ensuring that 
justice is done and that constitutional process is provided. If the 
office cannot fit the challenged conduct (such as punishing a 
subordinate for investigating and writing a memo about potential 
exculpatory evidence) into its purported message, there is a problem. 
Moreover, allowing the government to sidestep articulation 
undercuts political accountability. Government can avoid democratic 
correctives if government can promote a message without owning up 
to it through articulation. 
In addition to the articulation problem, political accountability is 
wholly unworkable in the realm of criminal process, a primary 
context for publicly employed attorneys. Political accountability is 
both insufficient and inadequate to secure the constitutional rights 
of criminal defendants whose life, liberty, and property are put into 
the hands of publicly employed attorneys.   
A. Political Accountability Is Insufficient to Secure Constitutional 
Rights 
With other types of government speech, it is at least plausible 
that if there is transparency and articulation of the government 
                                                                                                           
restriction on prosecutorial action and may require a prosecutor to actively protect the accused. 
See id. Rosenthal’s theory of managerial prerogative would prohibit prosecutor offices from 
punishing an employee “for honoring a constitutional obligation,” id. at 69, but would allow 
(by denying First Amendment protection for) managerial policy and discipline that “violate 
some state-law rule of professional ethics, but . . . no principle of constitutional law,” id. at 45. 
Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith assert that “prosecutors are ethically obligated to 
assure that the rights of their adversaries are protected.” See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE 
SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 306 (3d ed. 2004).  
 47. 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
 48. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
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message then political accountability may work. If a person does not 
like the government’s expressive choices, she can push for the 
speakers’ removal from office. Not so in the area of publicly 
employed attorneys.  
For example, what happens if a prosecutor’s office punishes an 
attorney for trying to provide a criminal defendant with her 
constitutionally guaranteed exculpatory evidence? It is near fanciful 
that criminal defendants, demoted prosecutors, or even defense 
attorneys will be able to successfully amass democratic correctives to 
fix such constitutional deficiencies. Providing criminal defendants 
constitutional process garners little public sympathy. In the words of 
Erwin Chemerinsky: “Unpopular minorities—criminal defendants, 
prisoners, undocumented immigrants—must have judicial 
protection; there is no realistic chance that such individuals will 
succeed in the majoritarian political process.”49 The lack of funding 
for criminal defense is indicative of the lack of public sympathy and 
concern for criminal defendants and for providing them with 
constitutionally sufficient process.50 In fact, many criminal 
defendants are disenfranchised and cannot even vote51—how they are 
to bring about political accountability is a quandary. 
Indeed, there is not only a lack of political accountability for 
failing to comply with the Constitution in criminal processes, but 
also a tendency to reward government employees engaging in such 
constitutionally unnacceptable behavior. Studies indicate that 
                                                                                                           
 49. Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United 
States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 61–62 (2004). 
 50. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 92 (1999) (“Providing genuinely 
adequate counsel for poor defendants would require a substantial infusion of money, and 
indigent defense is the last thing the populace will voluntarily direct its tax dollars to fund.”); 
Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 427, 430 (2009) (noting that “state legislatures have been on notice, 
sometimes for decades, regarding their state’s own indigent defense crises without taking 
action” and noting that the people in “the general electorate often demand that politicians 
take a ‘tough on crime’ stance,” which results in legislatures being “unresponsive to the 
unpopular and largely silent constituency of criminal defendants”); Eve Brensike Primus, 
Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 679, 699 (2007) (noting that despite the problems with indigent defense 
funding “there is little reason to believe that local, state, or federal legislatures will choose to 
contribute sufficient funds to solve the problem ex ante”). 
 51. Drinan, supra note 50, at 430 (“People accused of crimes are often excluded from 
the electorate because they tend to hail from poor and alienated groups, or have even been 
barred from voting if convicted of a felony.”); Primus, supra note 50, at 698–99 (“[S]ociety 
disenfranchises most convicts, and the public is not exactly clamoring for greater safeguards for 
criminal defendants”). 
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prosecutors are promoted and obtain office based on their conviction 
rate—not by complying with the Constitution or professional 
responsibility obligations, or by uncovering police or other 
governmental misconduct. As summarized by Erik Luna, “front-line 
prosecutors are evaluated for promotion (and thus higher salary and 
prestige) by their win-loss record, while chief prosecutors will be 
reelected or retained based on, inter alia, the rate and number of 
convictions obtained by their office.”52 Luna notes that dismissals 
and acquittals “may affirmatively damage their careers regardless of 
whether justice was done in the respective cases, including those 
involving credible claims of actual innocence.”53 Erwin Chemerinsky 
interviewed prosecutors across the country, including in Los 
Angeles, and summarized: 
Repeatedly, I heard from Assistant District Attorneys that they felt 
that they were evaluated based on their effectiveness in processing 
cases and gaining convictions. There were no incentives for 
uncovering police misconduct or for dismissing cases because of 
their suspicions about the police officers’ actions. . . . Such a 
promotion and award structure maximizes the incentive for 
prosecutors to disregard problems with police credibility that may 
undercut the strength of the prosecutor’s case.54 
The facts of Garcetti itself supply a ready example of actual dynamics 
in a prosecutor’s office. Ceballos attempted to fulfill his 
constitutionally required duties to a criminal defendant and suffered 
adverse employment actions as a consequence. He was punished, not 
rewarded. 
Public support tends to clamor around “tough on crime” 
candidates. Indeed, studies regarding judicial elections are shocking 
on this score. One study examining hundreds of decisions from 
elected judges in Pennsylvania found that “all judges, even the most 
punitive, increase their sentences as reelection nears.”55 Another 
                                                                                                           
 52. Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1213 (2005). 
 53. Id. (emphasis added); see also Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It is Not 
Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality 
Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 293 (2001) (“Promotions for 
subordinate prosecutors depend on their ‘scores’ for convictions. Winning gets rewarded while 
misconduct [such as failing to comply with the Constitution] goes unpunished.”). 
 54. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons 
of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 320–21 (2001).  
 55. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice 
Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004), quoted in Amanda Frost 
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recent empirical piece found “a strong relationship between election 
years for judges and the likelihood that a defendant will receive a 
death sentence. That is, conditional on being found guilty of 
murder, criminal defendants were approximately 15% more likely to 
be sentenced to death when the sentence was issued during the 
judge’s election year.”56  
Political accountability is also insufficient because criminal 
defendants (even with the unlikely assumption that they could amass 
majoritarian support) are unlikely to know about constitutional 
violations absent protection of speech. That is, if the prosecution is 
allowed to punish its employees for providing Brady material to a 
defendant, this will deter subordinate prosecutors from undertaking 
the speech in the first place or from suing when they are punished 
for speech made to protect the rights of criminal defendants. Absent 
protected speech from the subordinate prosecutor, the criminal 
defendant will have no ready means to know of the violation. 
Moreover, when the subordinate prosecutor can be punished for 
conveying such information to the defense against the 
recommendation of his supervisors (as that would fall within the 
scope of his official duties and thus the Garcetti rule57), the 
subordinate is chilled from informing the defendant at all. 
B. Political Accountability Is Inadequate to Protect Constitutional 
Process 
Political accountability is particularly problematic because 
constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants exist regardless of 
the political makeup. Constitutional process for criminal defendants 
should not depend on political accountability for implementation. 
Indeed, that is why it is in the Constitution. Fair criminal process 
was not left to the vagaries of political winds and majoritarian 
                                                                                                           
& Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 737 
(2010). 
 56. Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002). 
 57. Rosenthal argues against “a reading of Garcetti that would deny prosecutors 
protection even when they speak pursuant to a constitutional obligation.” Rosenthal, supra 
note 5, at 67. Although he notes that such a reading is possible, see id. at 68 n.120, he argues 
that the “conception of employer prerogative does not deny protection for an employee who is 
disciplined for honoring a constitutional obligation because an employer’s desire to suppress 
such information is not within the scope of a public employer’s constitutionally legitimate 
prerogatives,” see id. at 68. 
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sympathies. As Amanda Frost and Stefanie Lindquist explained: 
“Constitutionalism may be viewed as the antithesis of democracy 
because the very existence of a constitution presumes that some 
choices are to be withheld from the majority.”58 Thus there is an 
inherent incongruence with incorporating the government speech 
doctrine into speech protecting the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants: Political accountability—the cure for problematic 
government speech—depends on the political climate, while 
constitutional rights are supposed to exist regardless of the political 
climate.  
Further, for the criminal defendant who is deprived of 
constitutional process and protections, ultimate political 
accountability (removal from office) of the prosecutor does not cure 
the deprivation. The remedy is inadequate. As noted above, it is 
important to recognize that in the area of criminal prosecution and 
defense, there is no alternate forum where the defendant or 
prosecutor can vindicate constitutional rights or receive/provide 
different treatment. If subordinate prosecutors are chilled or 
punished for providing information to the defense, then the criminal 
defendant will not even know about the deprivation and will be 
unable to vindicate her constitutional rights at the time and place 
where it matters to her as a defendant. The defendant is not going to 
care if a prosecutor loses a subsequent election. Rather, the 
defendant will care that she receives constitutional process, including 
exculpatory evidence from the prosecution or dismissal of a case that 
should not be prosecuted. The defendant will want the subordinate 
prosecutor, like Ceballos, to be protected in providing speech that 
fulfills that constitutional requirement. The defendant may be able to 
avoid imprisonment or obtain a lesser sentence with such evidence. 
That remedy is what matters to the defendant, and that remedy is 
what the Constitution is intended to provide: justice.  
IV. CONTENT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S MESSAGE 
Another problem with the Garcetti rule and the treatment of 
public employee speech as government speech is the consequent 
content of the government’s message. Under the government speech 
theory, when the government is giving and/or funding its “own 
                                                                                                           
 58. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 55, at 729. 
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expressive conduct”59 or “its own policies,”60 then “it is entitled to say 
what it wishes.”61 For example, in Rust, the government had created 
the optional Title X funding.62 In so doing it could promote pro-life 
policies, pro-choice policies, or neither. Indeed, it need not provide 
any funding at all. In Johanns the government promoted beef—its 
message: “Beef. It’s what’s for Dinner.”63 But it could have 
promoted apple pie for dessert or yogurt for breakfast. Or 
government could just stay out of the food-promotion business 
altogether and promote none of it.  
But the overall content of the message delivered by publicly 
employed attorneys, again, in large part is not a policy choice. The 
government’s message must be to do justice and comply with the 
Constitution. The ABA Prosecution Function Standards state that 
“[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice.”64 The comment 
elaborates: 
Although the prosecutor operates within the adversary system it is 
fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to protect the 
innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the 
accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public. Thus, the 
prosecutor has sometimes been described as a “minister of 
justice” . . . .65 
Although summarized here by the ABA, the content of the message 
is not created by the ABA, but is dictated by the Constitution and its 
promise of due process and special protections for criminal 
defendants to ensure fairness and that justice be done.66 Thus, the 
Garcetti Court mischaracterized the situation when it held that it 
“simply” was allowing “the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created.”67 The Los Angeles 
                                                                                                           
 59. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 60. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 575 (2005) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). 
 61. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
 62. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 63. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554. 
 64. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (1993). 
 65. Id. § 3-1.2 cmt.  
 66. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. 
 67. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). 
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prosecutor’s office didn’t “commission” Ceballos’s memo, and more 
importantly, the office did not “create” his obligation to write it or 
to provide the materials to the defense. If Ceballos’s memo fell 
within his obligations under the Constitution, then the Constitution 
created Ceballos’s obligation to write the memo, an obligation that 
was also required by the applicable rules of professional conduct. 
Publicly employed attorneys should be protected in making such 
speech. It is not speech commissioned or created by their employers, 
but is speech that is required by the Constitution and the rules of 
professional conduct. 
The fact that publicly employed attorneys represent both the 
prosecution and defense underscores the deficiencies in the idea that 
the government commissions or creates the message and should be 
able to choose a side. As explained in the ABA Defense Function 
Standards, “A Court properly constituted to hear a criminal case 
must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge (and 
jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel 
for the accused.”68 Each of these three parties operates 
independently from each other and is “essential to the fulfillment of 
the court’s responsibility in the administration of criminal justice.”69 
In contrast, the theory of government speech as articulated in 
Rust is that by promoting one point of view (pro-life), “Government 
has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen 
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”70 But, in the case 
of the criminal justice system, the government is constitutionally 
required to follow certain procedures and to create fair proceedings 
that allow both sides to fully and fairly present their cases. Funding 
the criminal justice system is not government’s “own expressive 
conduct” that would allow government to employ what would 
otherwise be a viewpoint discriminatorily favoring of one side “to the 
exclusion of the other” side.71 The whole idea of the constitutional 
constraints and requirements regarding criminal processes is that the 
only message that government can promote is fair proceedings where 
justice is done. 
                                                                                                           
 68. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-1.2 (1993). 
 69. Id. § 4-1.2 cmt.  
 70. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).  
 71. See id. 
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Because government always employs the prosecution, and often 
employs the defense, it is helpful to examine the requisite content 
that each side can constitutionally promote. For the prosecuting 
attorney, the only message the government can promote is that 
justice be done.72 A prosecutor represents a sovereign’s brute power 
being brought to bear against an individual, and in so doing, the 
prosecutor’s only interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.”73 As explained in the ABA Criminal Justice 
Prosecution Function Standards, “this responsibility,” as exercised by 
a minister of justice, “carries with it specific obligations to see that 
the accused is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided 
upon the basis of sufficient evidence, including consideration of 
exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution.”74 The message of 
justice includes that the prosecution complies with the criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights. Importantly, contrary to Garcetti, 
the government cannot “buy” employee speech75 and promote a 
message of injustice in violation of the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants. The government simply lacks this “expressive 
choice.”  
Moreover, all prosecutors (subordinate or senior)76 have an 
independent and personal obligation to promote justice, uphold the 
Constitution, and abide by rules of professional conduct. When the 
                                                                                                           
 72. As noted in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, “A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice . . . .” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
cmt. 1 (2006). 
 73. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added); see also 
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 46, at 307 (quoting Berger); id. at 330 (discussing the 
“prosecutor’s duty to ensure [a] fair trial for the accused,” which “reflects the prosecutor’s 
duty to ‘seek justice’ rather than convictions”). 
 74. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3-3.11 cmt. (1993) (emphasis added). 
 75. Norton, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that Garcetti “treats public employees’ speech 
delivered pursuant to their official duties as the government’s own speech—that is, speech that 
the government has bought with a salary and thus may control free from First Amendment 
scrutiny.”). 
 76. The Rules of Professional Conduct specifically make the performance of ethical 
duties an individual responsibility that cannot be avoided by claiming that a supervisor directed 
the conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (a) (2006) (“A lawyer is bound 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of 
another person.”). A subordinate lawyer, however, will not be found in violation of the rules if 
she “acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable 
question of professional duty.” See id. at R. 5.2(b) (emphasis added). Notably, there is no 
exception for violations of clear professional duties—both the subordinate and supervisory 
lawyer will be in violation of the rule and subject to discipline. 
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prosecutor was admitted to the bar, she took an oath to uphold the 
Constitution and abide by the applicable rules of professional 
conduct. Publicly employed attorneys should be granted speech 
rights commensurate to such duties.  
The constitutional role of the publicly employed defense attorney 
is to provide a criminal defendant with effective and loyal assistance. 
Such assistance cannot be controlled by the prosecuting government, 
but must be independent therefrom.77 As the Supreme Court has 
recognized: “[The defense attorney’s] principal responsibility is to 
serve the undivided interests of his client. Indeed an indispensable 
element of the effective performance of his responsibilities is the 
ability to act independently of the Government and to oppose it in 
adversary litigation.”78 
Further, as explained by Freedman and Smith, the criminal 
defendant’s right to counsel is “‘the most precious’ of [her] rights, 
because it affects one’s ability to assert any other right.”79 Thus, 
“[t]he right to competent counsel is central to every other right of the 
criminally accused, and the denial of this right destroys the 
foundation of adversarial justice.”80 
It is hard to conceive of a way in which the speech of the defense 
attorney on behalf of his criminal defendant client and in opposition 
to the government could somehow be the government’s “own 
expressive conduct”81 that entitles the government to control that 
speech and “say what it wishes.”82 Even more so than with the 
prosecution, the state cannot “buy” the public defender’s speech to 
promote a message different from providing criminal defendants 
constitutionally sufficient—meaning loyal, effective, and 
                                                                                                           
 77. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–22 (1981). 
 78. Id. at 319 n.8 (emphasis added) (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 
(1979)); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 46, at 16 (explaining that the defense 
“lawyer is not the agent or servant of the state,” but instead is “the client’s champion against a 
hostile world” (internal citations omitted)). 
 79. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 46, at 13 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984)). 
 80. See id. at 332 (emphasis added). Freedman and Smith explain that the American 
“adversary system represents far more than a simple model for resolving disputes,” but has 
been “constitutionalized by the framers” and “consists of a core of basic rights that recognize, 
and protect, the dignity of the individual in a free society.” See id. at 13. Thus, “[a]n essential 
function of the adversary system [] is to maintain a free society in which individual human 
rights are central.” See id. 
 81. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
 82. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector 
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
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independent—representation.83 The theory of the government 
speech cases is entirely at odds with the idea of loyal and 
independent representation of the criminal defendant.  
Finally, and importantly, the publicly employed defense attorney 
must be able to exercise independent professional judgment.84 In 
Polk County v. Dodson, the Court noted the importance of the 
independence of public defenders.85 The Court explained two ways 
in which the public defender must be independent.86 First, public 
defenders must be independent from superiors in their own office.87 
The Court explained, “a defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of 
his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior,” in 
part because the “public defender works under canons of 
professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent 
judgment on behalf of the client.”88 Indeed, Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.8(f)(2) forbids a third party from paying an 
attorney for a representation unless “there is no interference with the 
lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-
lawyer relationship.”89 Thus, although public defenders are paid by a 
third party for their representation—namely, their employer—to 
provide representation to criminal defendants, the employer cannot 
interfere with the attorney’s independence or the attorney-client 
relationship. The public defender’s superiors cannot direct her 
actions in the representation. The client is the criminal defendant 
(even though the attorney is paid by someone else). 
The Dodson Court additionally recognized “the constitutional 
obligation of the State to respect the professional independence of 
the public defenders whom it engages,” noting that an implicit 
                                                                                                           
 83. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 322 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)) 
(explaining that “[t]here can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an 
effective and independent advocate”) (emphasis added). 
 84. J. Vincent Aprille II emphasizes the importance of this independence from the state 
and loyalty to the criminal defendant in arguing that Garcetti should not apply to public 
defenders. See Aprille, supra note 6, at 14. However, Aprille concludes by saying that Garcetti 
does not apply to public defenders in that role because their speech is more akin to speech of a 
citizen. See id. at 14–15. Nevertheless, while public defender speech is made on behalf of 
private citizen criminal defendants, the public defender does not speak as a lay citizen. Indeed, 
public defenders serve an essential role in the administration of justice, which is why their 
speech must be protected. 
 85. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320–22. 
 86.  Id. at 321–22. 
 87.  Id. at 321. 
 88. Id. 
 89.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2) (2006). 
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aspect of constitutionally sufficient defense counsel is “the 
assumption that counsel will be free of state control.”90 Again, it is 
impossible to square the idea of constitutionally sufficient, publicly 
employed defense attorneys with the theory that the speech of such 
public defenders should be treated as the government’s own speech 
that can be dictated and shaped by the government.  
V. SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER CONTROL 
A final problem with fitting publicly employed attorney speech 
into the theory of government speech is the scope of government 
employer control shown in Garcetti. In Garcetti, the Court held that 
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties . . . the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.”91 The Court went on to define “official 
duties” broadly, appearing to include employer control over all 
responsibilities of the attorney.92 In applying the rule to Ceballos’s 
speech, the Court opined that official duties (and the concomitant 
lack of Free Speech Clause protection) included whenever the 
attorney goes “about conducting his daily professional activities, 
such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, . . . preparing 
filings[, and] . . . writing a memo that addressed the proper 
disposition of a pending criminal case.”93 Essentially, the Court 
indicates that anything that is done within the scope of an attorney’s 
responsibilities is government speech. “When he went to work and 
performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a 
government employee.”94 Unfortunately, the Court did not limit the 
“tasks that [Ceballos] was paid to perform” to tasks that he was 
specifically assigned to perform by his government supervisor. The 
memo in question was written on Ceballos’s own initiative in an 
attempt to preserve the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. 
No one in the prosecutor’s office asked him to write it. Yet because 
such speech was part of “conducting his daily professional 
activities,”95 it was interpreted to be speech belonging to the 
government and thus subject to government control and discipline. 
                                                                                                           
 90.  Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321–22. 
 91.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (emphasis added).  
 92.  Id. at 422. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 95.  Id. 
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The broad scope of speech pulled into the government speech 
doctrine interferes with the professional independence of publicly 
employed lawyers. Rust again provides a contrasting example. In 
Rust, the majority concluded that the regulations were permissible 
because the doctors could additionally work in a clinic that was not 
funded by Title X and provide abortion counseling in that setting96 
or could opt out of Title X funding altogether and fund their own 
clinic.97 Moreover, patients could be told that Title X simply did not 
cover post-conception healthcare or counseling.98 Unlike the doctors 
in Rust, prosecutors and public defenders cannot opt out of the 
criminal justice system to provide a different “message” free from 
their government employer’s control.  
The broad scope of employer control is particularly problematic 
for the criminal defense attorney. Again, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Polk County v. Dodson, “[A] defense lawyer is not, and 
by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an 
administrative superior.”99 As noted above, the Court recognized 
that both the constitutionally dictated function and professional 
responsibilities of the public defender do not allow for employer 
control over public defenders.100 Rather, implicit in the criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel is “the assumption that 
counsel will be free of state control” and “[t]here can be no fair trial 
unless the accused receives the services of an effective and 
independent advocate.”101 Under our criminal justice system, the 
defense attorney’s role is not to “act[] on behalf of the State or in 
concert with it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests of 
his client.’”102 Thus, “a public defender is not acting on behalf of the 
State; he is the State’s adversary.”103 The publicly employed defense 
                                                                                                           
 96.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (“The Title X grantee can continue to 
perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it 
simply is required to conduct those activities through programs that are separate and 
independent from the project that receives Title X funds.”). 
 97.  Id. at 199 & n.5. 
 98.  See id. at 200. 
 99.  Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). 
 100.  See id. at 321–22 (explaining that public defenders themselves “work[] under 
canons of professional responsibility that mandate [their] exercise of independent judgment on 
behalf of the client” and that the State has a “constitutional obligation . . . to respect the 
professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages”). 
 101.  Id. at 322 (emphasis added). 
 102.  Id. at 318–19 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)). 
 103.  Id. at 322 n.13. 
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attorney’s speech thus cannot be treated as government speech. Not 
only is the government not “say[ing] what it wishes”104 when the 
public employee speaks, but instead, the government is being 
opposed and challenged by the public employee. 
Even inside the public defender’s office, subordinate attorneys 
have independent obligations to their clients that cannot be 
controlled by their employer. Again, the Dodson Court explained: 
The personal attorney-client relationship established between a 
deputy [subordinate public defender] and a defendant is not one 
that the [supervisor] public defender can control. The canons of 
professional ethics require that the deputy be “his own man” 
irrespective of advice or pressures from others. A deputy [subordinate] 
public defender cannot in any realistic sense, in fulfillment of his 
professional responsibilities, be a servant of the [supervisor] public 
defender. He is, himself an independent officer.105 
The Supreme Court has recognized the need for this 
independence for lawyers even outside the criminal defense context. 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held that the Free 
Speech Clause prohibited Congress from restricting attorneys who 
received federal funding from raising constitutional and validity 
challenges to existing welfare laws.106 The Court recognized that 
even though attorneys received congressional money, “[t]he lawyer 
is not the government’s speaker,” but instead represents the interests 
of her clients.107 Indeed, the Court recognized that “[t]he advice 
from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to 
the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a 
generous understanding of the concept.”108 Admittedly, the 
attorneys in Velazquez were not government employees, but instead, 
recipients of federal funds that allowed them to provide 
representation to the poor. But the Court in Velazquez recognized, 
as it failed to do in Garcetti, the importance of the independence of 
attorneys: “An informed, independent judiciary presumes an 
                                                                                                           
 104.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
 105.  Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321 n.11 (quoting Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp. 1362, 
1365 (D. Nev. 1974)). 
 106.  Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001). 
 107.  Id. at 542. 
 108.  Id. at 542–43. 
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informed, independent bar.”109 Thus the Court held that Congress’s 
attempt to limit the kinds of issues an attorney could raise with 
federal funding was unconstitutional because it “prohibits speech 
and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper 
exercise of the judicial power. Congress cannot wrest the law from 
the Constitution which is its source.”110 In like manner, the Court in 
Garcetti should have clearly prohibited government employers from 
punishing attorneys for complying with constitutional requirements 
for criminal prosecution.111 
Finally, both prosecutors and public defenders have individual 
professional obligations to uphold the Constitution and to comply 
with the rules of professional conduct. Indeed, they have sworn an 
oath to do so. Regardless of what their employer decides should or 
should not be done, where Constitutional rights and professional 
obligations require that speech be made, the attorney’s speech 
fulfilling that obligation should be protected from employer 
discipline.112 Such protection is necessary to protect the underlying 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. As I have argued in 
another context, if attorneys can be punished for speech made to 
ensure or preserve the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, 
then those rights are severely undercut and perhaps entirely lost.113 
Part of the theory underlying the Garcetti rule and the 
government speech doctrine is that the employee has no personal 
interest in undertaking the speech when speech is made as an 
employee (rather than “as a citizen”).114 The Garcetti Court found it 
                                                                                                           
 109.  Id. at 545. 
 110. Id. 
 111.  Although Rosenthal argues for an interpretation of Garcetti that would still prohibit 
discipline for honoring a clear violation of Brady, he recognizes that the case can be read to 
condone such discipline. See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 68 n.120; see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
 112.  Rosenthal argues that the First Amendment should protect “an employee who is 
disciplined for honoring a constitutional obligation,” but should not protect speech violating 
“state-law rule of professional ethics.” See id. at 45, 68. Rosenthal contends that violation of 
constitutional obligations is outside of employer prerogatives and thus should be outside of the 
Garcetti rule, but that violation of state-law rules of professional ethics is within employer 
prerogatives.  
 113.  See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court 
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 371–73 (2010). 
 114.  Indeed, this was how the Garcetti majority interpreted Pickering v. Board of 
Education. In Pickering, the Court had required a “balanc[ing] between the interests of the 
teacher as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer.” 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added). The Garcetti Court, 
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dispositive that Ceballos had written his memo “pursuant to his 
duties as a calendar deputy.”115 The Court determined, 
consequently, that:  
Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what 
he . . . was employed to do. It is immaterial whether he 
experienced some personal gratification from writing the 
memo . . . . The significant point is that the memo was written 
pursuant to Ceballos’ [sic] official duties. Restricting speech that 
owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a 
private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control 
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.116 
In other words, because Ceballos would not have written the memo 
if he had merely been a private citizen and had not been employed as 
a prosecutor (that is, the memo “owes its existence” to his work 
duties), then he has not lost any First Amendment rights that he 
would have enjoyed as a private citizen. The theory is that the public 
employee has not “lost” anything by virtue of his public employment 
when the speech that lacks protection is speech that the employee 
would never have undertaken absent the employment.117 In a similar 
vein, a concurrence of the Ninth Circuit opinion affirmed by 
Garcetti had theorized: “[W]hen public employees speak in the 
course of carrying out their routine, required employment 
                                                                                                           
emphasizing “as a citizen,” determined that “when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (emphasis added). However, prior 
Supreme Court cases had applied the Pickering balancing approach even where speech was 
made by an employee as an employee. See, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 
(finding Pickering’s balancing test applicable for speech made by Meyers “as an employee” for 
the one portion of speech that regarded matters of public concern); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. 
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (finding protection for public employee work-related 
discussion with supervisor).  
 115.  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 116.  Id. at 421–22. 
 117.  Id.; see also id. at 423–24 (“Employees who make public statements outside the 
course of performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection 
because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the 
government. . . . When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities, 
however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government 
employees.”). 
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obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that 
speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right.”118 
The theory, however, is flawed, particularly in the context of the 
government-employed attorney and the public employee providing 
constitutionally required speech. First, in the context of a 
prosecuting attorney fulfilling her duties under Brady v. Maryland,119 
the government employer does not “commission or create” the 
speech obligation. Rather, that obligation is created by the 
Constitution itself. Second, a prosecuting attorney is not fulfilling 
mere job duties imposed by her employer in so speaking. She not 
only has a “personal interest” in undertaking the speech, but she has 
personally sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution upon admission 
to the bar. Whether or not her “employer” considers it a part of her 
duties to investigate and provide the defense with Brady materials, 
the attorney has sworn an oath that personally (as a citizen and a 
lawyer) obligates her to speak. This personal obligation is not, as 
mischaracterized by the Garcetti Court, merely a matter of 
“experienc[ing] some personal gratification” in one’s speech.120 
Rather, it is a serious and weighty personal obligation. Both the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Constitution require 
investigation and provision of exculpatory evidence to the defense, 
with a threat of professional discipline for failing to so do.121 
Moreover, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not allow a 
subordinate lawyer to avoid discipline for a clear violation of the 
Rules by arguing that a supervising lawyer told him to act in that 
manner.122 The obligation is personal, and attorneys need the 
requisite speech rights to fulfill speech obligations imposed by the 
Constitution and Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Publicly employed attorneys play vital roles in our criminal justice 
systems. Many aspects of those roles are dictated by the 
                                                                                                           
 118.  See id. at 416 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 
1168, 1189 (2004) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)). 
 119. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 120.  “It is immaterial whether he experienced some personal gratification from writing 
the memo; his First Amendment rights do not depend on his job satisfaction.” Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 421. 
 121.  See Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) 
(2006); see also ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS, 3-3.11 & cmt.  
 122.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2006). 
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Constitution, and some are additionally required by rules of 
professional conduct. To categorize attorney speech as government 
speech, which can be shaped and controlled as government 
employers please, frustrates the constitutional role that these 
attorneys play in our system of justice. 
Commentators have condemned Garcetti and argued for a return 
to the Pickering standard for public employees.123 Pickering certainly 
would be a vast improvement over Garcetti because the free speech 
rights of the publicly employed attorney would have to be weighed 
and thus recognized to some degree. But Garcetti highlights the 
particular problems associated with protection and lack of protection 
for attorney speech—an area that certainly has been insufficiently 
explored and developed. Where the public employee is also an 
attorney, rather than applying the governing case law covering free 
speech for all public employee speech, special considerations should 
be taken into account and perhaps a new methodology should be 
employed. Attorney speech serves very specific functions essential to 
our entire system of justice. These functions include the protection 
of the constitutional rights of criminal and civil litigants and assisting 
individuals in invoking and avoiding the power of government when 
government seeks to deprive them of life, liberty, or property. In 
light of the particular role that attorneys play in our constitutional 
structure, attorney speech should enjoy special protection when it is 
essential to the role of the attorney in the administration of justice 
and in the protection of constitutional rights of litigants—especially 
of criminal defendants.124 
 
 
                                                                                                           
 123.  See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 5. 
 124.  I am currently working on a paper, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting 
Attorney Speech, that proposes a theory and methodology for protecting such speech. 
